Book Project:
Great Powers, Regional Powers, and the Balance of Power in Conflict
Abstract: When do great powers cooperate with regional powers and when do they fight? This project considers how the distribution of power at the systemic and regional levels of international politics conditions relations between great powers and regional powers and incentivizes conflict, hedging, or cooperation. I propose a general theory of great power-regional power relations. The theory contends that great powers are responsive to competition with other great powers, while regional powers have more limited interests and respond primarily to competition with regional rivals. When states engage in peer competition, they are incentivized to cooperate with other states and look for partners to balance against their rivals. But when a state gains a preponderance of power — a great power achieves unipolarity in the international system or a regional power approaches regional hegemony — their incentives change. Because great powers and regional powers act based on incentives set by different distributions of power, their interests may or may not align, and this sets the stage for cooperation or conflict. The theory is extended to generate expectations for state strategy in conflict and post-conflict settings and tested with a mixed-methods approach. A quantitative cross-case analysis of an original dataset of state strategy in conflicts in the Middle East from 1945 through 2010 and a series of three qualitative case studies on the North Yemen Civil War, the Lebanese Civil War, and the Second Intifada find support for the theory’s expectations.
Working Papers:
The Power and Peril of Regional Hegemony
Abstract: When are rising regional powers likely to cooperate with great powers, and when are they likely to engage in conflict? I consider the role of the regional distribution of power and how this interacts with the systemic distribution of power to provide incentives for alignment between regional powers and great powers, focusing on the behavior of regional hegemons. As a rising regional power approaches a preponderance of power in its region, its interest in safeguarding its regional primacy conflicts with its interest in receiving benefits from great powers, which have their own goals for regional influence. When the international system contains two or more great powers, conditions are ripe for the regional hegemon to hedge and extort support from multiple great powers while limiting the influence of each. This is likely when great powers are in competition with one another and value maintaining cooperation with the regional hegemon because of its privileged position in regional politics. The theory draws out the unique conditions of regional hegemony, which involve persistent defense of a sphere of influence and incentives to expand its hegemonic frontier. The theory is tested with a cross-national analysis of an original dataset of great power and regional power behavior in conflicts in the Middle East from 1945 through 2010, which demonstrates that states behave differently under conditions of regional hegemony than other distributions of power, and a case study of the North Yemen Civil War. The article concludes with a discussion of the theory’s implications for conditions of systemic unipolarity and its relevance to contemporary international politics.
Conceptualizing Norm Diffusion: Network Structure and Social Pressure
Abstract: How do norms diffuse through the international system? Previous research has explained key mechanisms and specific cases, but important puzzles remain: Why do some norms emerge among powerful states and diffuse to the periphery while others emerge from and spread through the periphery before core states adopt them? Why does the diffusion of some norms start and stop, spreading in waves? This article considers the relationship between network structure and diffusion mechanisms to explain different patterns of norm diffusion in international politics. Drawing on sociological and network analytic approaches, it proposes a theoretical framework that conceptualizes norm diffusion in terms of network structure and social pressure. Testable implications of the theory are illustrated with a summary of the normative shift regarding the use of antipersonnel landmines. The theory can explain what conditions are conducive to hegemonic or peripheral diffusion and when diffusions are likely to start or stop. The findings have policy implications regarding best practices for norm entrepreneurs.